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THE MISSOURI WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
No action existed at common law for death caused by a wrongful
act.' The social and economic consequences of this rule were con-
sidered undesirable2 and in 1846 Parliament passed what is now
known as Lord Campbell's Act.8 This statute created a cause of action
for wrongful death, to be brought in the name of the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased for the benefit of specified persons. In 1855
the Missouri Legislature enacted a similar statute "for the better
security of life, property and character."4 The statute now provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect or default
is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
1. Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W.2d 591 (1932); Wells v. Davis,
303 Mo. 388, 261 S.W. 58 (1924); Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C.R.R., 219 Mo.
524, 118 S.W. 40 (1909) ; Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brownl. 205, 123 Eng. Rep. 756
(K.B. 1607).
The English rule also precluded recovery by third persons for the loss of ser-
vices. Baker v. Belton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). Missouri
courts did not agree with this rule until long after enactment of the wrongful
death statute. James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853); Marx v. Parks, 39 S.W.2d
570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931). In Marx, the court held a parent's suit was barred
under the death act because there was failure to allege that the deceased, a minor
daughter, was unmarried and childless, but it held plaintiff had stated a cause of
action for loss of services. A different result was reached in Mennemeyer v. Hart,
359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960 (1949). The supreme court, without mentioning the
Marx case, held that the statute pre-empted the field and was now the exclusive
remedy for wrongful death. Cf., Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson Sanitarium Co., 319
Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367 (1928).
2. See generally PRossER, ToRTs § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
3. An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accidents, 1846,
9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
4. Mo. REV. STAT., ch. LI, at 647 (1855). The Missouri act contained two
separate wrongful death sections. Mo. REv. STAT., ch. LI, § 2, at 647 (1855)
applied to deaths caused by public carriers and their employees. Mo. REv. STAT.,
ch. LI, § 3, at 648 (1855) covered all other situations. The operation of the
former was penal in character. See Greir v. Kansas City, C. C. & St. J. Ry., 286
Mo. 523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921); Boyd v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 249 Mo. 110, 155 S.W.
13 (1913); Russell, Measure of Damages Under Missouri WrongfuZ Death Act,
15 Mo. L. REv. 31 (1950). The other section has always been considered com-
pensatory. See, e.g., McCullough v. W. H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15,
216 S.W. 803 (1919); Johnson v. Dixie Mining & Dev. Co., 171 Mo. App. 134,
156 S.W. 33 (1913). In 1955 the legislature revised the statute and eliminated the
penal section. Mo. Laws 1955, § 1, at 778.
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thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or the
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured....
The statute designates those persons who have standing to sue. They
are the spouse, children, parents of a minor child and personal repre-
sentative of the deceased, in that order of priority.
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
After the creation of this statutory cause of action, courts had to
decide its nature and relation to other causes of action. This involved
a consideration of the death act's relation to the survival act, personal
injury actions of the beneficiary and contract actions. In addition the
courts had to decide whether the statute merely gave to the beneficiary
the cause of action of the deceased or created a new and different
cause of action.
A. Survival Act
Missouri has both a death and a survival act. The survival act pre-
vents the abatement of an action for personal injuries not resulting in
death, because of the subsequent death of either the person injured or
the tortfeasor,6 while the death act applies only to injuries causing
death. The remedies created by the two acts theoretically are mutually
exclusive. The distinction is clear in the abstract, but may be difficult
to apply in a given factual situation. For example, if there is some
doubt whether the death was caused by the injuries, there is a possibil-
ity of double recovery. A judgment under the survival act in such a
case does not preclude an action under the death act.7 The injured
party may institute suit and then die. His personal representative could
then continue the action and receive judgment, provided he is able to
"prove" the death did not result from the act of negligence. However,
it is possible that the spouse could "prove" in an action for wrongful
death that the injuries did cause the death. The spouse then also
could receive judgment. The tortfeasor would be held liable twice
for the same act of xiegligence notwithstanding the theoretical mutual
exclusivity of the remedies. The court has indicated that the proper
remedy for defendant is to interplead, in a separate action, all poten-
tial plaintiffs in order to bind them to the factual determination of the
cause of death."
5. Mo. RpV. STAT. § 537.080 (1959).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (1959).
7. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17 (1955); Downs
v. United Ry., 184 S.W. 995 (Mo. 1916).
8. This remedy under Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.060 (1959) is needed since the
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B. Personal Injury Actions of Beneficiary
The wrongful death action is independent of any action for personal
injuries to the beneficiary himself. Even if the action for death arises
out of the same accident as that for personal injuries, bringing them
separately is not splitting a cause of action."
C. Contract Actions
The courts have held that the cause of action conferred by the
statute sounds in tort and not contract.10 However, the existence of
a contractual relation between the tortfeasor and either the deceased
or the beneficiary does not preclude an action for wrongful death.
It is well settled that while a "tort" is a wrong done independent
of contract, there are torts committed in the nonobservance of
contract duties. And if a tort arising.out of nonobservance of
such duties results in a death, a surviving person entitled to sue
may avail himself of the Wrongful Death Statute.,,
When death results from the negligent performance of a contractual
duty, one cannot recover damages for death under a contract action. 2
doctrine of res judicata will not bar the multiple liability. Plaza Express Co. v.
Galloway, supra note 7.
The measure of damages under the survival act is what the deceased could
have recovered. This does not include loss of earnings beyond the date of death.
Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 336 Mo. 497, 79 S.W.2d 109 (1935). Under the death act,
the measure is the pecuniary loss of the beneficiary. Cases cited note 107 infra.
Loss of capacity to earn wages is a proper item of damage. Overby v. Mears
Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 363, 128 S.W. 813 (1910). Therefore, loss of earnings
between injury and death may be considered under either statute. The problem of
how to handle this overlap is a difficult one in those jurisdictions where the sur-
vival and death acts give concurrent remedies and various solutions have been
worked out. See Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W.
806 (1922) ; Note, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 68 (1942). This problem is not present in
Missouri since the remedies are mutually exclusive.
9. Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 354 Mo. 461, 189
S.W.2d 538 (1945).
10. Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1931); Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson
Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367 (1928). At this point it should be
noted that there can be no recourse to the wrongful death act where workmen's
compensation laws are applicable. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 287.120 (1959).
11. Braun v. Riel, supra note 10, at 623. Although the court used the word
"nonobservance," it would have been more correct to say "negligent performance"
as there must be some undertaking under the contract before a tort liability can
arise. See Glen v. Hill, 210 Mo. 291, 109 S.W. 27 (1908). In the Glen case the
court said that "even if the promise to repair had been made upon a valuable
consideration, and the defendants had breached the contract, such breach would
not have furnished a basis for an action of tort... but the remedy would be an
action for breach of the contract." Glen v. Hill, supra at 299, 109 S.W. at 29.
This indicates there must be some minimum performance.
12. Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367
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D. Theory of Recovery
The court has vacillated between two conceptualizations of the basic
nature of the right created by the statute. One is the "transferred
right" theory which states that the beneficiary has the same cause of
action as the deceased. The other is the "new cause of action" theory
which maintains that the beneficiary has a new, statutory right not
enjoyed by the deceased. The statute is ambiguous on this point. This
controversy has been given more importance than it deserves. Its
principal effect lies in the application of the dead man statute." If
the deceased was a party to the cause of action, the defendant is pre-
cluded from testifying; but if the statute creates a new cause of action
in the beneficiary that the deceased never held, the defendant may
testify.1 4
In 1875, the supreme court in Entwhistle v. Feighner" held that
the statute conferred a new cause of action on the beneficiary. A wife
sued for the wrongful death of her husband. The lower court had
ruled that defendant was incompetent to testify in his own behalf.
The supreme court reversed on the ground that the deceased was
never a party to this cause of action. This case was ignored by later
Missouri cases espousing the transferred right theory,"o which was ac-
cepted law until 1904. In Behen v. St. Louis Transit Co." the
court did not specifically say that the statute creates a new cause of ac-
tion, but this conclusion can be inferred from the authorities on which
(1928). A patient died because of the failure of the defendant's employees to
watch over him. The statute of limitations on wrongful death had run so plaintiff
based the action on the contract. The court held that in essence the action was an
attempt to recover damages for wrongful death and as such was barred by the
statute of limitations.
13. The courts constantly refer to one theory or the other as if the results
would be different depending upon which was applied. However, apart from ap-
plication of the dead man statute, the conceptualization of the nature of the right
is seldom controlling. For example, the court in Behen v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
186 Mo. 430, 85 S.W. 346 (1904) gave the new cause of action theory as a reason
for holding that the personal representative of the beneficiary may maintain the
action. In Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920
(1933) the court still embraced the new cause of action theory but rejected the
proposition upheld in the Behen case.
14. See State ex Tel, Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926);
Entwhistle v. Feighner, 60 Mo. 214 (1875).
15. 60 Mo. 214 (1875).
16. Millar v. St. Louis Transit Co., 216 Mo. 99, 115 S.W. 521 (1908) ; Bates v.
Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493, 104 S.W. 73 (1907); Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197
Mo. 616, 95 S.W. 851 (1906); Hennessy v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104,
46 S.W. 966 (1898) ; Gray v. McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.W. 398 (1891) ; Gibbs
v. City of Hannibal, 82 Mo. 143 (1884); Proctor v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 64
Mo. 112 (1876).
17. 186 Mo. 430, 85 S.W. 346 (1904).
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it relied. The failure to discuss contrary Missouri cases greatly weak-
ened the authority of Behen, however, and it was quickly discredited.,
So the transferred right theory was still the law in 1929 when the su-
preme court in State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues19 again was faced with
the Entwhistle problem: the lower court had refused to allow a de-
fendant to testify on the ground that he was a party to the cause of
action. The supreme court decided that the theory in Entwhistle was
the better rule and adopted the new cause of action theory. With
State ex rel. Thomas the rule was settled and all subsequent cases have
followed it.20
The adoption of the new cause of action theory added greater
theoretical consistency to the wrongful death statute. The apparent
reason for enacting such a statute is to provide a means of compensa-
tion for those who have materially suffered from the death. The
statute makes no claim of preventing the abatement of the deceased's
action as does the survival act. It merely states that the tortfeasor is
liable to the beneficiary "notwithstanding" the death. The damages
are considered compensation for the beneficiaries, not the estate,2 1
and the damages are not the same under the statute as those which
the deceased would have received. Therefore it is more realistic and
logical to say that the beneficiary has a statutory right which confers
a new and different cause of action.
II. WHO MAY SUE
The plaintiff in a wrongful death action has the burden of establish-
ing that he falls within a statutorily created class of persons. There
may be clear negligence, but if no plaintiff can qualify to bring an
action, the tortfeasor will not be held liable for his wrongful act.
It is important to keep in mind that the subject of this subsection is
who may sue and that this problem is distinct from the question of
proving actual damages to that person. The beneficiary section states:
damages may be sued for and recovered;
(1) By the husband or wife of the deceased; or
(2) If there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue
within six months after such death, then by the minor
child or children of the deceased, whether such minor
child or children of the deceased be the natural born or
adopted child or children.., or
18. See Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493, 104 S.W. 73 (1907).
19. 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926).
20. Glasgow v. City of St. Joseph, 353 Mo. 740, 184 S.W.2d 412 (1944) ; Gold-
schmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W.2d 1 (1937); Jordan v. St.
Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 335 Mo. 319, 73 S.W.2d 205 (1934); Cum-
mins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933).
21. Hegberg v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 164 Mo. 514, 147 S.W. 192 (1912).
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(3) If such deceased be a minor and unmarried, whether such
deceased unmarried minor be a natural born or adopted
child.., then by the father and mother... or
(4) If there be no husband, wife, minor child .. . or if the
deceased be an unmarried minor and there be no father or
mother, then.., by the administrator or executor of the
deceased .... 22
A. Spouse's Suit
No difficult problems arise when a spouse sues within six months of
the death of the deceased spouse. Remarriage of the survivor has no
effect on the right of that spouse to maintain the action.2 -
The wording of the statute creates special problems when the spouse
fails to bring suit but has made a settlement. The problem of whether
defendant is protected from a subsequent suit by the children centers
around the provision that if there is a spouse the child's right to sue
is withheld for six months after death. This section is viewed as
giving the spouse a preferential right, provided he or she fulfills the
condition of "appropriating" the right within six months of death.24
What the court means by appropriation is unclear. Some cases 2 indi-
cate that the bringing of a suit is a condition precedent to the vesting
of the right. However, in Hamilton v. Missouri Pao. Ry.,"- G the court
said that the authority to bring suit implies an existing cause of action
in the wife, and that the six months is merely a limitation on the time
she has to control the cause of action. In this case the children of the
deceased brought an action after the six month period. The widow
had never brought suit, but had received payment and signed a re-
lease. The court held the payment and release were sufficient appro-
priation of the cause of action to bar the children. But in Chamberlain
v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc.,27 the court said in dicta that
the wrongful death action did not vest immediately but must be ap-
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1959).
23. Davis v. Springfield Hasp., 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S.W. 696 (1920). Pope
v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 175 S.W. 955 (Mo. 1915) held that a common law wife has
the same rights under the statute as a wife married with statutory formalities,
but the case was based on the fact that the law then recognized such marriages,
which is no longer true. Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.040 (1959). Therefore a common
law wife probably no longer qualifies.
24. Huss v. Bohrer, 317 Mo. 204, 295 S.W. 95 (1927); Shephard v. St. Louis,
I.M. & So. Ry., 3 Mo. App. 550 (1877).
25. See Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, Inc., 354 Mo. 461, 189
S.W.2d 538 (1945); Huss v. Bohrer, supra note 24; Packard v. Hannibal & St.
J.R.R., 181 Mo. 421, 80 S.W. 951 (1904); McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 329
(1882).
26. 248 Mo. 78, 154 S.W. 86 (1913); accord, Blessing v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R.,
171 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1943).
27. 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538 (1945).
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propriated. This language could be at odds with the Hamilton case be-
cause it implies that bringing suit is a condition precedent to vesting
of the right. On the other hand, a release could be considered an ap-
propriation. A weakness of the Hamilton opinion is that it is based in
part on language that is no longer part of the wrongful death act. That
language was not controlling in the decision, however. Taking all
factors into consideration, a release by a spouse without bringing suit
will probably still be considered a bar to the right of the children.
If a spouse brings suit under the statute after the initial six months,
the fact that there are no minor children must be averred,28 and the
fact that there are minor children will prove fatal.29 A suit com-
menced after six months cannot be saved by amending the petition to
include the children as plaintiffs after the one year statute of limita-
tions has run, because the original petition stated no cause of action. 0
Once the suit is instituted within the six months, the spouse has ap-
propriated the cause of action and a voluntary nonsuit or dismissal
without prejudice will not affect the right to bring a new action after
the six months regardless of the existence of minor children.3 1
B. Child's Suit
A suit by a child offers more difficulty. The important thing is that
they be minor children. As the court in Mingus v. Kurn 2 said:
The fact that the plaintiffs are the children of the deceased gives
them no cause of action unless they were minor children, a fact
which is not alleged .... There must be an allegation of minority,
and of course this followed by proof of minority. A suit under
this provision of the statute cannot be maintained by adults and
minors jointly.33
In any action by a minor child, all the minor children must be joined.34
Failure to do so is fatal because the statute is viewed as conferring an
28. Barker v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280 (1886).
29. Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574 (1862).
30. Fair v. Agur, 354 Mo. 394, 133 S.W.2d 402 (1939); Goldschmidt v. Pevely
Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W.2d 1 (1937).
31. Huss v. Bohrer, 317 Mo. 204, 295 S.W. 95 (1927); Shepard v. St. Louis
I.M. & So. Ry., 3 Mo. App. 550 (1877) (dismissal without prejudice held voluntary
nonsuit); Anderson v. Asphalt Distrib. Co., 55 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1932); Packard
v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 181 Mo. 421, 80 S.W. 951 (1904).
32. 142 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
33. Id. at 879.
34. Nehs v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957). Posthumous children have
been held to be covered by the statute. Bonnarens v. Lead Belt Ry., 309 Mo. 65,
273 S.W. 1043 (1925).
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indivisible right; no child has a separate interest under the statute. 5
If the child was a minor at the time of the parent's death, the right of
action is not lost by attaining majority-6 because "when the right of
action accrues to the child, it is a vested right which is not determined
by the attainment of majority.... ."37
A divorce decree and an award of custody will not divest the child
of the right of action for the death of the parent to whom custody
was not awarded.38 The reason given is that the child is "in no sense
precluded by a judgment to which he was not a party"3 9 and, there-
fore, he still has a right to care and support by the parent.
Turning next to the effect on a suit by the minor children of the
spouse's preferential right, it has been held that when both parents
die as the result of a common disaster, the children need not wait
until the end of the six month period.40 The court reasoned there was
no presumption of survivorship in such a situation. "The very lan-
guage of the statute presupposes, as a condition precedent to a six
months' wait, that the father or mother.., should be in esse."41 One
case held that where a spouse had instituted suit but had died while
it was pending, the minor children could later bring suit.42 The reason
given was that it is the spouse's right to recover, not the mere com-
mencement of the suit, that cuts off the children's rights. This case
was decided when the personal representative of the beneficiary had
no rights under the statute, however, which is not now the law.43
Thus the reasoning in the case is no longer compelling, and doubt is
cast on the validity of the rule. 4
35. Nelms v. Bright, supra note 34, at 487; Fair v. Agur, 345 Mo. 394, 133
S.W.2d 402 (1939) ; Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C.R.R., 219 Mo. 524, 118 S.W.
40 (1909).
36. Nehns v. Bright, supra note 34, at 487; Rutter v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 81 Mo.
169 (1883).
37. Rutter v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 36, at 171. This harmonizes with
the rule that remarriage will not divest the right of the wife to maintain the ac-
tion. See Davis v. Springfield Hosp., 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S.W. 696 (1920).
38. Sipple v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 125 Mo. App. 81, 102 S.W. 608 (1907).
39. Id. at 94-95, 102 S.W. at 613.
40. Aley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 211 Mo. 460, 111 S.W. 102 (1908).
41. Id., at 479, 111 S.W. at 107.
42. Provided they did so before the one year statute of limitations expired.
Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 671, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933).
43. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1959) authorizes the personal representative to
continue the suit.
44. If the personal representative of the beneficiary can continue the action,
the children have no rights under the statute because the cause of action is indi-
visible. See cases cited note 35 supra. However, the rule in Cummins v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933), which allows the child to
sue (see note 42 supra), may be preferable because the measure of damages in a




The problems involved in a suit by the parents for the wrongful
death of a minor child are diverse. Not only must the relation be-
tween the parents and the child be explored, but the relation between
the parents as well. The basis of the right to recover is not the loss of
services of the child but rather the right of the child itself to recover.45
Therefore, the emancipation of the son is no defense to an action by a
parent for that son's wrongful death.48 Likewise, a divorced mother,
without custody, can maintain the action even though through the
decree she lost the right to his services.47
The mother may sue for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child.'8 The court based this rule on the fact that the illegitimate
child may inherit from the mother; thus, where the child could not
inherit from the father, the father could not sue for the death of the
child.' 9 The parents may also sue for death due to prenatal injuries.5 0
of the children. The possible effect of rejecting the Cummins rule is that the
amount of recovery will be lessened to the detriment of the children, who prob-
ably will be the eventual recipients of the proceeds of the suit.
For example, a surviving spouse is entitled to recover, as one item of damage,
the burden of supporting any minor children. Infra, note 122. But when the
spouse is deceased and the action is continued by the personal representative the
amount recoverable is properly limited by that shorter known life span. Morton
v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831 (1920); see note 120
infra. Thus, the children would be cut off from support for the remaining period
of minority in so far as that period overlapped with the life expectancy of the
supporting parent, which would be a proper measure of damage for them under
the Cummins rule. See McPherson v. St. Louis I.M. & So. Ry., 97 Mo. 253 (1888) ;
Goss v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 614 (1892). Thus, that amount should
either be included in the suit by the personal representative of the surviving
spouse, or, to achieve the same result, the children rather than the surviving
spouse's personal representative could be permitted to sue, as in Cummins.
45. Dalton v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co., 188 Mo. App. 529, 174 S.W. 468
(1915); Hennessy v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104, 46 S.W. 966 (1898);
cf. James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853). There is dictum to the contrary in Menne-
meyer v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960 (1949), but the court confused the
measure of damages with the basis of the action.
Looking at the right of the child does not violate the new cause of action theory.
The court does not say that the parents have the child's action but merely use
this as a test to determine whether the parents have a cause of action under the
statute. The statute specifically authorizes such a test by saying the action may
be maintained when death results from such negligence "as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action .... " Mo. REv.
STAT. § 537.080 (1959).
46. Matlock v. Williamsville, G. & St. L. Ry., 198 Mo. 495, 95 S.W. 849 (1906).
47. Hennessy v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104, 46 S.W. 966 (1898).
48. Marshall v. Wabash R.R., 120 Mo. 275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894).
49. Id. (dictum). Adoption of the deceased's child would cut off the right of
either natural parent in favor of the adopting parents. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 453.090
(1959).
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Since the child has a right of action for prenatal injuries, the parents
also have such a right if the injuries result in death.
The relation of the surviving parents has been likened by the courts
to a tenancy by the entirety.51 The death of one while the suit is
pending will not abate the action.52 The courts rely on the use of the
word "survivor ' s in the statute. The courts have had more difficulty in
determining whether or not one parent may maintain the action alone
if the other is still alive. The statute prior to 1955 said that suit could
be maintained by "the father and mother, who may join in the suit,
and each shall have an equal interest in the judgment .... ,,"4 The use
of "may" would seem to make joinder permissive, but the court held
that the parents must be joined, and an unwilling parent cannot be
joined involuntarily. 5 This meant that a husband could settle with the
defendant, and then refuse to join with the wife, thus cutting off her
right. This construction was changed by the 1955 revision. The
statute now provides that "if the surviving parents are unable or
decline or refuse to join in the suit within six months after such death,
then either parent may bring .. . the action in his or her name
alone... .",5 However, the recovery is to be for the use and benefit
of both parents.
D. Suit By Personal Representative of the Deceased
The personal representative of the deceased had no cause of action
until 1905.57 When the beneficiary section was extended to add the
personal representative of the deceased, the courts set certain quali-
fications. The general theory of recovery is that the administrator
does not sue for the benefit of the estate but rather as trustee for the
beneficiaries5 s This significantly affects the damages that may be
recovered; he cannot recover what the deceased could recover, but
50. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
51. Herrell v. St. Louis - San Francisco Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929).
52. Senn v. Southern Ry., 124 Mo. 621, 28 S.W. 66 (1894); Tobin v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 18 S.W. 996 (Mo. 1891).
53. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 537.080 (3) (1959). See Tobin v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,
supra note 52.
54. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 3652 (1939).
55. Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C.R.R., 219 Mo. 524, 118 S.W. 40 (1909).
56. Mo. Ru. STAT. § 537.080 (3) (1959).
57. Mo. Laws 1905, p. 135.
58. Demattei v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 139 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1940), where
recovery by a foreign administrator was allowed because it is not an asset of the
estate and therefore not subject to the claims of the creditors of the deceased.
Accord, McCullough v. W. H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15, 216 S.W. 803(1919); Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 182 Mo. App. 600, 169 S.W. 337 (1914);
Johnson v. Dixie Mining & Dev. Co., 171 Mo. App. 134, 156 S.W. 33 (1913); Heg-
berg v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 164 Mo. App. 514, 147 S.W. 192 (1912).
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merely the pecuniary loss of the beneficiary. 9 There must be an
allegation and evidence that someone is competent to take under the
descent laws. 0 Those persons must be named, and their relationship
to the deceased shown.8 1 The essential difference between the bene-
ficiaries who take under the descent laws, and the beneficiaries
specifically designated in the death act, called the statutory benefici-
aries, is that the latter may bring the suit while the former have no
standing by themselves. They can recover only through the personal
representative of the deceased. The personal representative cannot
maintain this action if any of the statutory beneficiaries survive the
deceased.82 This is so even when the survival is only for a few hours,
and death stems from the same disaster that claimed the life of the
deceased.65
E. Suit By Personal Representative of the Beneficiary
There was some conflict in Missouri cases whether the personal
representative of the statutory beneficiary has any cause of action
under the statute. In the early ease of Gibbs v. City of Hannibal,",
the court said that the cause of action "is a right personal to the
beneficiary, and does not survive to his personal representatives."' 5
Here all the beneficiaries died in a common disaster, and there was
no person to whom the action could survive. The reasoning does not
make it clear whether the court held that the cause of action could
not survive or merely that there was no possibility of knowing to
whom it should survive. Later in Behen v. St. Louis Transit Co.,66
the court, without mentioning the Gibbs case, held the administrator
of the deceased beneficiary could revive the cause of action. A distinc-
tion between the two cases is that in the Behen case the beneficiary
had already instituted suit while in the Gibbs case the administrator
initiated the suit. However, much of the reasoning in the two cases
is in conflict. Behen accepts the new cause of action theory, while
Gibbs relies on the transferred right theory. On the other hand, both
59. Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943); Johnson v. Dixie
Mining & Dev. Co., supra note 58.
60. Kirk v. Wabash R.R., 265 Mo. 341, 177 S.W. 592 (1915); Lynch v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 261 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); McCullough v. W. H.
Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15, 216 S.W. 803 (1919).
61. Johnson v. Dixie Mining & Dev. Co., 171 Mo. App. 134, 156 S.W. 33 (1913).
62. Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920
(1933) ; Betz v. Kansas City So. Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284 S.W. 455 (1926) ; Longan
v. Kansas City Ry., 299 Mo. 561, 253 S.W. 758 (1923).
63. Betz v. Kansas City So. Ry., supra note 62.
64. 82 Mo. 143 (1884).
65. Id. at 149.
66. 186 Mo. 430, 85 S.W. 346 (1904).
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cases speak in general terms which would seem to justify no distinc-
tion. If the right of the beneficiary is a personal right, as Gibbs says
it is, then it should make no difference whether the beneficiary brought
the action or not. Finally, the court in Milelr v. St. Louis Transit Co.""
rejected Behen on all points. In this case, like the Behen case, the
beneficiary had brought suit before his death. Not only was the
distinction rejected, but the court reasserted the transferred right
theorye" and said that the statute conferred a personal right. This
firmly established the rule that the right did not extend to the personal
representative of the beneficiary. This was a very harsh rule. For ex-
ample, in Betz v. Kansas City So. Ry.,6 the court held that the survival
of the husband meant that no cause of action accrued to the admin-
istrator of the wife. Then, the husband having died a few hours after
the wife, there was no one left who could sue under the statute. The
tortfeasor completely escaped liability even though there might
have been someone such as a mother, father, brother or sister pecuni-
arily damaged by his tort. The legislature then amended the statute
to allow the personal representative of the beneficiary to maintain
the action.70
III. DEFENSES
A. Scope of Liability
Plaintiff in an action for wrongful death has no more difficulty in
proving liability than in the usual tort case. The courts' wide applica-
tion71 of the death act is shown by cases in which the wrongful act
merely hastened death. An early Missouri caseT2 said the wrongful
death act did not apply to this situation. Two subsequent cases"3 have
67. 216 Mo. 99, 115 S.W. 52 (1909); accord, Cummins v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933). See text at notes 42-44 supra.
68. The Millar case, supra note 67, was later overruled on this point. State
exr el. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926). See text accompanying
notes 16-20 supra.
69. 314 Mo. 390, 284 S.W. 455 (1926). But see Cummins v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933).
70. Mo. Laws 1949, p. 633 amending Mo. REy. STAT. § 3670 (1939) which is
now Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1) (1959). This section reads as follows:
Causes of action for death shall not abate by reason of the death of any
party to any such cause of action, but shall survive to the personal represen-
tative of such party bringing such cause of action and against the person ...
liable for such death ....
71. The courts have gone so far as to hold an aider and abetter liable. Gray
.v. McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.W. 398 (1891).
72. Jackson v. St. Louis I.M. & So. Ry., 87 Mo. 422 (1885).
73. McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 219 Mo. 468, 118 S.W. 78 (1909). The
early case was distinguished on the grounds that the court was asked whether
hastening is causing, while here the question is as to the propriety of the instruc-
tion stating that the injury directly caused the death. The court indicated that if
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criticized this early decision, but both were decided on other grounds.
The indication, therefore, is that such an action will lie under the
statute.
B. Tortfeasor's Death
There was at one time an exception to this broad concept of liability.
The courts said that the statutory action could not be maintained
against the personal representative of the tortfeasor even though
suit had already begun.7' The legislature changed this rule, and now
the death of the tortfeasor will not abate the action.7 5
C. Release Before Death
A questionable rule still in effect is that a release by and payment
to the deceased is a bar to any action for wrongful death.7 6 Two
reasons underlie the rule: (1) if it were not a bar there could be
double compensation; and (2) the court should not place hinderances
in the way of settlements. However, such a settlement may not con-
template death,77 i.e., it may be settlement for the personal injuries
but not for death. In such a case there would be no double compensa-
tion because the measure of damages for the personal injury is differ-
ent than that under the death act.7 8
D. Contributory Negligence
The statute specifically states that the defendant may "plead and
prove as a defense that such a death was caused by the negligence of
it were faced with the same issue as the early case that case would be overruled.
Accord, Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S.W. 851 (1906) (decided
on the grounds of a release signed by the deceased). See also Fetter v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 174 Mo. 256, 73 S.W. 592 (1903).
74. Mennemeyer v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960 (1949); Hendricks v.
Kauffman, 340 Mo. 74, 101 S.W.2d 84 (1936); Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493,
104 S.W. 73 (1907).
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (2) (1959). It makes no difference that the
defendant died before the plaintiff. Harrison v. Weisbrod, 358 S.W.2d 277 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1962).
76. Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S.W. 851 (1906). Cf.
State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926); Entwhistle v.
Feighner, 60 Mo. 214 (1875). In the Strode case, which held that a release by
the deceased barred any subsequent claim under the death act, the court seemed
to accept the transferred right theory, but said it made no difference which theory
they followed. In State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues the court said that the Strode
case did not really accept the transferred right theory but rather avoided the
question. However, it is submitted that the rule of the Strode case is not sound if
one follows the new cause of action reasoning of State ex rel. Thomas V. Daues.
77. See settlement and facts in Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra note 76.
78. See text accompanying note 102 infra. For a discussion of overlapping
damages see note 8 supra.
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the deceased. 7 9 It should be noted that the statute refers only to the
negligence of the deceased. But the court has held that the contribu-
tory negligence of the beneficiary will also bar recovery. 0 But when
only one of the beneficiaries was negligent in a suit by the parents
of a deceased minor child, the court reasoned, in Herrel v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry.,81 that because the cause of action is indivisible
between the parents, contributory negligence must be a complete de-
fense or none at all. The father's contributory negligence would not
bar the mother if she sued alone. Therefore, unless the negligence
could be imputed to her, their joint action was not barred by it. The
court overruled prior cases and refused to impute the negligence to
her, thus permitting recovery in spite of the father's negligence. This
rule was weakened when a court of appeals said that, "if the negli-
gence of the father was the primary and proximate cause of the in-
jury it would defeat his recovery, even though he had joined the
mother . . ."2 The supreme court, however, later re-affirmed its
former decision when it held that in the absence of joint enterprise
or agency "the negligence of the wife is no bar to recovery by the
husband and wife for the death of their minor son .... ,,83
E. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations84 requires suit to be brought within one
year of the date of death, but there are liberal provisions for extention.
The time that a defendant is absent from the state is not calculated
within the period. 5 Also, any voluntary nonsuit, arrested judgment
or reversal of a favorable verdict will extend the period another
year.8
There is a conflict in the cases whether the statute of limitations is
a matter of substantive right or merely one of limitation and repose.
If it is the latter, then it is not an integral part of the right and
failure to raise the point at trial waives it. However, if it is a sub-
stantive right, then it is inseparable from the whole statutory right
and can be raised anytime. In 1913, the court in Chandler v. Chicaga
79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.085 (1959).
80. Chawkley v. Wabash Ry., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S.W. 20 (1927); Wiese v.
Remme, 140 Mo. 289, 41 S.W. 797 (1897) ; White v. National Lead Co., 99 S.W.2d
535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936); Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co., 161 Mo. App. 552,
144 S.W. 185 (1912).
81. 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929).
82. White v. National Lead Co., 99 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936).
83. Reynolds v. Thomas, 215 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Mo. 1948).





& A.R.R.87 said, "when a statute creates a new right, and goes on to
prescribe the means of acquiring it, the statutory plan is exclusive,
and parties are confined to the statutory remedy."8 8 This case held
that the limitations section was a matter of substantive right, ignor-
ing the earlier case of Cytron v. St. Louis Transit Co.89 In the latter
case, the plaintiff father had not joined the mother until after the one
year limitation had expired. The court said that failure to raise the
point at trial was a waiver, the statute being merely one of limitation
and repose. The Chandler case, however, is bolstered by the more
recent case of Baysinger v. Hanser,90 which held the limitation of the
death act is one of substantive right and not a mere technical bar to
the remedy.
The cause of action accrues on the death of the deceased., 1 The
failure to discover the identity of the tortfeasor will not halt the
running of the time period.92 Filing a petition, even in the wrong
court, and issuing a summons, even though not timely served, com-
mences the action and the statute is tolled.93
An interesting aspect of the statute of limitations is the relating-
back concept, applicable when the petition is amended after the
statute of limitations has run. The question is whether the court will
allow a defective petition to be cured by such amendment. The deter-
mining factor is whether the party asserting the right had an interest
in the action at the time the statute of limitations expired. For ex-
ample, in Slater v. Kansas City Terminal Ry.,94 a widow sued as ad-
ministratrix within the statutory period under the Federal Employers
Liability Act. Her claim was improper,95 so she filed an amended peti-
tion under the wrongful death act after the statutory period. The
court held that "the substitution by amendment was a mere change in
87. 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35 (1913).
88. Id. at 600, 158 S.W. at 37.
89. 205 Mo. 692, 104 S.W. 109 (1907); accord, Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352
Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852 (1943) (dictum). The dictum in the Wentz case was the
chief source of confusion since this case was decided after Chandler v. Chicago
& A.R.R., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35 (1913). Except for this, it could have been
assumed that the Chandler case had tacitly overruled the Cytron case.
90. 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947).
91. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Glasgow v. City of St.
Joseph, 353 Mo. 740, 184 S.W.2d 412 (1945); Kennedy v. Burrier, 36 Mo. 128
(1865).
92. Frazee v. Partney, supra note 91, at 919; cf. Kober v. Kober, 324 Mo. 379,
23 S.W.2d 149 (1929).
93. Tice v. Milner, 308 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1957). The court, however, limited
its decision to cases where the filing of the petition in the wrong court was not
due to negligence.
94. 271 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954).
95. The husband was not an employee of the defendant.
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capacity in which plaintiff sued""' 6 (i.e., widow and not administra-
trix) ; therefore, the change was not a commencement of a new action,
but related back to the filing of the original petition. Likewise, one
spouse may amend by adding the name of the other spouse after the
year, for the spouse alone has an interest in the action.97 A different
rule exists when a widow with minor children, who has sued after the
six months preferential right, tries to add the children to the suit after
the year. She is a stranger to the suit after the six months, and has
no interest in it. Her original petition has no validity, so there is
nothing to which the amendment may relate back98
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The Missouri statute is vague in stating the measure of damages.
It merely says that such damages may be awarded "as the jury may
deem fair and just... with reference to the necessary injury.... ."09
The same is true of wrongful death statutes in most other states.100
The courts of these states, in the absence of legislative guide lines,
have developed two general theories of compensation: (1) loss to the
estate; and (2) loss by the survivors. °10
Courts that follow the loss to the estate rule are divided into three
groups depending upon the verbal formula used.1 '2 The first group
allows damages to be determined by the present worth of the probable
net earnings the deceased would have made during his life expectancy,
deducting his expenses.103 A second theory is the accumulations for-
mula. This is generally held to be the amount that the deceased, by his
own efforts, would have saved during the remainder of his life ex-
pectancy.104 Obviously, recovery would be less under this theory than
the previous one because normally the deceased would have accumu-
lated less than his net earnings. The third view is the same as the first
except that there is no deduction for the living expenses of the
deceased.10
Missouri courts have adpoted the measure of recovery determined
by the loss to the survivors. 00 However, such loss is limited to
96. Id. at 583.
97. Cytron v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 692, 104 S.W. 109 (1907).
98. Fair v. Agur, 345 Mo. 394, 133 S.W.2d 402 (1939).
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1959).
100. McCoRMicK, DAMAGES §'95 (1935).
101. See generally ibid.
102. Id. at § 96.
103. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garnett, 129 Miss. 795, 93 So. 241 (1922).
104. See, e.g., Hough v. Illinois Cen. R.R., 169 Iowa 224, 149 N.W. 885
(1914).
105. See, e.g., Williams v. McCranie, 27 Ga. App. 693, 109 S.E. 699 (1921).
106. Troll v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 182 Mo. App. 600, 169 S.W. 337 (1914).
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pecuniary injury. °T "The test of the right of recovery.., is the rea-
sonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of the
deceased, or a pecuniary injury from the death."'1 8 Any consideration
of damages necessarily centers around the court's definition of pecuni-
ary injury. The requirement is derived from the statutory words
"necessary injury"'10 9 and it has been said that the statute is broad
enough to include any such injury, "whether present, prospective, or
proximate. ' .1 However, pecuniary injury does not include the pain
and suffering of the deceased"', nor the mental anguish of the bene-
ficiary.112 The jury is not limited to precise mathematical calculation,
but is given wide discretion by the appellate courts, and its assessment
will not be altered unless there is an abuse of such discretion." 3 How-
ever, the statute places a maximum limit on recovery which now is
twenty-five thousand dollars.
107. Domijan v. Harp, 340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960); Miller v. Williams, 76
S.W.2d 355 (Mo. 1934); Barth v. Kansas City Elec. Ry., 142 Mo. 535, 44 S.W.
778 (1898); McGowan v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 109 Mo. 518, 19 S.W. 199
(1892). The failure to prove pecuniary damages still leaves plaintiff the right
to recover nominal damages. Stroud v. Masek, 262 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1953).
Although damages are said to be limited to the pecuniary loss, this is not al-
ways true. For example, in the case of a child's death, recovery often exceeds
the amount arrived at by a strict calculation under the excompounded measure. See
note 145 infra. Also, in the case of a wife's death, recovery for loss of comfort and
society is in conflict with a strict interpretation of the pecuniary loss rule. See
note 130 infra and accompanying text. Also, the statute specifically allows ag-
gravating circumstances to be considered and punitive damages to be awarded.
This provision means that recovery in certain circumstances can be more than
purely compensatory. Where the facts justify exemplary damages, the financial
standing of the defendant may be considered. Cole v. Long, 207 Mo. App. 528,
227 S.W. 903 (1921). Little is said in the cases on mitigating damages. However,
it is clear that the insurance on the deceased's life is not to be considered. Bright
v. Thacher, 202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S.W. 788 (1919). This rule is based on the
idea that the tortfeasor should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrong-
ful act by relying on the prudence of the deceased in providing, at the deceased's
expense, for the maintenance of his dependents.
108. Domijan v. Harp, supra note 107, at 734.
109. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1959).
110. Barth v. Kansas City Elec. Ry., 142 Mo. 535, 559, 44 S.W. 778, 785
(1898).
111. Boyd v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 236 Mo. 54, 139 S.W. 561 (1911); McGowan
v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 109 Mo. 518, 19 S.W. 199 (1892) ; Goss v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 614 (1892).
112. Barth v. Kansas City Elec. Ry., 142 Mo. 535, 559, 44 S.W. 778, 785 (1898);
McGowan v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., supra note 111; Calcaterra v. lovaldi, 123
Mo. App. 347, 100 S.W. 675 (1906) ; Goss v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 111.
113. Domijan v. Harp, 340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960); Marlow v. Nafziger Bak-
ing Co., 333 Mo. 790, 63 S.W.2d 115 (1933). The test is whether the amount of
the verdict shocks the conscience of the court. Wright v. Osborn, 356 Mo. 382,
201 S.W.2d 935 (1947). Those factors to which the courts most often look in
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A. Spouse's Suit
I. DEATH OF HUSBAND
The law will imply pecuniary loss from the negligent killing of a
husband,114 but this is no help in determining the specific amount."",
To do this, consideration must be given to those things the courts
consider a pecuniary interest. Most obvious of those is the deceased's
lost wages. His earning capacity is a proper consideration for the
jury,16 but the
loss is not necessarily the whole amount of the deceased's prob-
able earnings. This, simply from the fact that she is not entitled
to the whole of such earnings after her support and other matters
of pecuniary loss are secured therefrom. 1 7
However, neither is she limited to the actual earnings of the de-
ceased;"18 it is proper to consider the possibility of increased wages
and other services he might render to her. For example, a wife of a
retired man is not excluded because he earns no wages. Accumulating,
protecting and managing money and property wisely may have been
assets of the husband, and the loss of one who had such capacity could
be a grievious pecuniary loss. 9 Other important factors to be con-
sidered are a husband's age, state of health and probable length of
life. 2 0 Evidence of all the mentioned factors are admissible without
determining excessiveness of the verdict are age, physical condition, earning capa-
city and size of family, as they are applicable. Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94
Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1887) ; Marx v. Parks, 39 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) ;
Stookey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 215 Mo. App. 411, 249 S.W. 141 (1923);
Cole v. Long, 207 Mo. App. 528, 227 S.W. 903 (1921); Kelly v. City of Higgins-
ville, 185 Mo. App. 55, 171 S.W. 966 (1914).
114. Steinmetz v. Saathoff, 84 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
115. The failure to prove an exact amount will not necessarily limit recovery to
nominal damages. Most v. Goebel Constr. Co., 199 Mo. App. 336, 203 S.W. 474
(1918). This is because the court will give a wife every possible benefit of the
presumption of pecuniary loss. The wife stands, in this respect, in a much more
favorable position than the personal representative. See text accompanying notes
148 & 150 inf/ra.
116. Overby v. Mears Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 363, 128 S.W. 813 (1910).
117. Knight v. Sadtler Lead & Zinc Co., 75 Mo. App. 541, 549 (1898); accord,
Haines v. Pearson, 107 Mo. App. 481, 81 S.W. 645 (1904). Any consideration of
future earnings must be discounted to their present worth; what will be received
in the future does not have the same value as that which is immediately realiz-
able. See Clark v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 318 Mo. 453, 300 S.W. 758 (1927)
(personal injuries); Bagley v. City of St. Louis, 268 Mo. 259, 186 S.W. 966
(1916).
118. Boyd v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 236 Mo. 54, 139 S.W. 561 (1911).
119. Loomis v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 188 Mo. App. 203, 175 S.W. 143 (1915).
120. Schaub v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S.W. 924 (1891). In
looking at the probable length of life of the deceased, it is also necessary to
consider the probable length of life of the plaintiff, as recovery is based on
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specific allegation for they are damages that flow naturally from the
injury.121 The burden of educating and supporting the children alone
during their minority is another proper element in the damages.122
Therefore, it is proper for the widow to plead and prove the number
and ages of her children. 12 3
An important restriction is that there can be no recovery for loss
of the comfort and society of the husband.24 However, in Haines v.
Pearson,125 the court said that "the personal attention of the husband
to insure her comfort, and the many ways he might make himself
helpful and useful to her are proper things to consider in setting
damages. '1 2 This language comes suspiciously close to allowing
damages for the loss of comfort and society, but the court specifically
disaffirmed the idea. 127
II. DEATH OF WIFE
The basis of a husband's damages for the death of his wife is much
like that of the widow's suit. In calculating damages he may rely on
such items as her capacity to do housework'1 28 and the expense of her
whoever's life expectancy is the shorter. Morton v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co.,
280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831 (1920). Remarriage will not affect the amount of
recovery. Davis v. Springfield Hosp., 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S.W. 696 (1920).
The cases do not consider whether the wife may recover funeral and medical
expenses as they do in other situations. Wilt v. Moody, 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953)
(wife's death); Rains v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 71 Mo. 164 (1879) (child's
death). It could be argued that the wife normally incurs no such expense but
the husband's estate does. See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 102 (1935).
121. Holmes v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 176 S.W. 1041 (Mo. 1915).
122. Wilkerson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 69 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934);
Burton v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. App. 427, 168 S.W. 889 (1914).
123. Holmes v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 176 S.W. 1041 (Mo. 1915); Boyd v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 236 Mo. 54, 139 S.W. 561 (1911) ; O'Mellia v. Kansas City, St.
J. & C.B.R.R., 115 Mo. 205, 21 S.W. 503 (1893).
124. Boyd v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra, note 123; Schaub v. Hannibal & St.
J.R.R., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S.W. 924 (1891); Haines v. Pearson, 107 Mo. App. 481,
81 S.W. 645 (1904); Knight v. Sadtler Lead & Zinc Co., 75 Mo. App. 541 (1898).
125. 107 Mo. App. 481, 81 S.W. 645 (1904). The husband was sixty-eight and
earned $35 a week. The issue was whether a verdict for $2,500 was excessive.
126. Id. at 486, 81 S.W. at 646.
127. A husband may recover for loss of the comfort and society of his wife.
Cases cited note 130 infa Consider the following language in Furnish v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry., 102 Mo. 669, 676, 15 S.W. 315, 317 (1891): "By the term 'society'
. . . is meant such capacities for usefulness, aid and comfort as a wife." How
different are these words from those of the Haines case? See text accompanying
note 126 supra.
128. Hartzler v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 140 Mo. App. 665, 126 S.W. 760 (1910).
He may likewise put into evidence the cost of a housekeeper to take care of his
children. Leaman v. Campbell 66 Express Truck Lines, 355 Mo. 939, 199 S.W.2d
359 (1947).
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last illness.12 9 The principal difference is that a husband may recover
for the loss of the comfort and society of his wife.1" 0
B. Chid's Suit
In a child's suit for wrongful death of the parent, juries are not
limited to exact calculations, but are vested with considerable discre-
tion.' 3' Reflecting this, damages are not limited to the amount of the
earnings of the deceased parent, nor does failure to show such earn-
ings limit recovery to nominal damages. 3 2 In discussing damages, an
appellate court said that:
[I]n actions such as this the physical, mental and moral training
of a child by its parent is to be considered as having a pecuniary
value in estimating the loss which the child sustains by reason
of the parent's death;.., the child is entitled to recover for the
loss of a parent's care, nurture, guidance, training, and educa-
tion; and.., these may be considered as having a pecuniary as
well as moral value. 3
Such damages, however, are limited to the period of the child's minor-
ity.-3 In considering loss of moral training and advice, the jury is to
take into account the fitness of the parent to render such services."0r
C. Parent's Suit
In a parent's suit for the wrongful death of a minor child, the law
will presume the life of the child was of pecuniary value to the
parent.136 It is no defense to show that the child was not living with
the parent.' 37 The measure of damage is basically the loss of services
of the child during minority, to which is added the funeral and related
129. Wilt v. Moody, 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953).
130. Martin v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (Mo. Ct. App.
1921) ; Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69 (1926) ; of., Furnish v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 102 Mo. 669, 15 S.W. 315 (1891).
131. Gamache v. Johnston Tin Foil & Metal Co., 116 Mo. App. 596, 92 S.W.
918 (1906).
132. Stoher v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 91 Mo. 509, 4 S.W. 389 (1887); Sipple
v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 125 Mo. App. 81, 102 S.W. 608 (1907).
133. Gentry v. Wabash R.R., 172 Mo. App. 638, 652-53, 156 S.W. 27, 31-32
(1913). Accord, Stoher v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., supra note 132; Gamache v.
Johnston Tin Foil & Metal Co., 116 Mo. App. 596, 92 S.W. 918 (1906); Goss v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 50 Mo. App. 614 (1892).
134. McPherson v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 97 Mo. 253, 10 S.W. 846 (1889);
Goss v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 133.
135. Goss v. Missouri Pac. Ry., supra note 133.
136. Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888).
137. Heath v. Salisbury Home Tel. Co., 27 S.W.2d 31 (1927).
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expenses, minus the expenses of support and maintenance. 138 Under
this formula it would be possible to find liability but no damages since
the support expense might far exceed any loss of services or funeral
expenses. In such case the jury would be limited to awarding nominal
damages. 39
The early rule in Missouri was that there could be no recovery for
loss of society of the child.140 The status of this rule was confused
when the supreme court in Sharp v. National Biscuit Co. 41
stated in dicta that it would allow such recovery. This indication of a
shift in policy caused a few cases to be appealed on the point. The
courts of appeals refused to believe the supreme court would follow
the dicta.'12 They labeled the statement inadvertent and not binding
because the supreme court, in Behen v. St. Louis Transit Co.,"43
had re-affirmed its adherence to the rule limiting recovery to pecuni-
ary injury. The Behen case, however, was not concerned with this
particular problem. While it did support the pecuniary injury concept,
it never considered loss of society. 4' The appellate courts prevailed
138. Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934); Harrison v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 291 S.W. 525 (Mo. 1927); Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo.
286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Calcaterra v. Iovaldi, 123 Mo. App. 347, 100 S.W. 675
(1906); see Rains v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 71 Mo. 164 (1879) for a listing of
items of damage. An allegation of general damages will allow evidence of such
items as burial, hospital, medical and ambulance expenses. Hildreth v. Key, 341
S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
139. See Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934) (dictum). In consider-
ing whether or not the damages are excessive, an appellate court will look at the
possibility of an increase in earning power. McCrary v. Ogden, 267 S.W.2d 670
(Mo. 1954).
140. Leahy v. Davis, 121 Mo. 227, 25 S.W. 941 (1894).
141. 179 Mo. 553, 78 S.W. 787 (1904).
142. Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co., 161 Mo. App. 552, 144 S.W. 185 (1912);
Dando v. Home Tel. Co., 126 Mo. App. 242, 103 S.W. 103 (1907) ; Calcaterra v.
lovaldi, 123 Mo. App. 347, 100 S.W. 675 (1906); Marshall v. Consolidated Jack
Mines Co., 119 Mo. App. 270, 95 S.W. 972 (1906).
143. 186 Mo. 430, 85 S.W. 346 (1904).
144. It is not inconceivable that if the court had been faced with this particular
issue in Behen it could have adhered to the pecuniary injury concept and still have
allowed recovery for the loss of society. Those cases which allow the husband to
recover for the loss of the society of the wife show that such recovery and pecuni-
ary injury are not necessarily incompatible. See Martin v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921); Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App.
550, 288 S.W. 69 (1926). At least the court could define pecuniary injury so
broadly as to encompass loss of society. See Haines v. Pearson, 107 Mo. App. 481,
81 S.W. 645 (1904). It is interesting to note that the decisions in Haines and
Sharp were handed down the same year. This adds weight to the argument that
the dictum in the Sharp case actually did represent a change in attitude. Un-
fortunately, the question did not reach the supreme court until 1934, thus leav-
ing unanswered the question of where the 1904 court actually stood.
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and the accepted rule today is that there can be no recovery for loss of
the child's society.145 There is, however, a way to circumvent it. Evi-
dence of a child's devotion to his parents is admissible when coupled
with evidence that he turned over earnings to them, because this bears
on the possibility of future gifts. 1'4
D. Suit By Personal Representative
As previously mentioned, a suit by the personal representative of
the deceased must show that the beneficiary is competent to take under
the descent laws. This means that the descent laws are controlling
in determining who may share in the recovery and the amount each
is to receive. The legislature, by allowing the personal representative
to sue for the benefit of others, greatly extended the number of
people who might qualify as beneficiaries. The courts, fearful of
allowing persons to recover who had suffered no injury, added the
requirement that pecuniary damage must be shown. 47 Definite and
exact proof is not required, for whenever there is a reasonable prob-
ability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of another, the
untimely death raises a presumption of pecuniary loss.1 8
There is a partial exception to the rule requiring a showing of
pecuniary loss. Where the suit is for the benefit of more than one
relative, the courts have said that evidence of pecuniary loss may be
admitted, even though it applies only to some of the beneficiaries and
not to others. 149 This is the case when because of the descent laws all
the beneficiaries would share equally in the judgment.
It is necessary to translate pecuniary loss into some ascertainable
sum. The failure to do so could limit recovery to nominal damages.co
145. See Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934). However, note that the
courts have sustained verdicts beyond what the normal measure of damages
would allow. See Russell, Measure of Damages Under Missouri Wrongful Death
Act, 15 Mo. L. REV. 31, 41 (1950). A permissible conclusion is that in reality the
courts do allow recovery for loss of comfort and society.
[I]n such cases substantial verdicts have been sustained, where it is very
evident that the jury have stepped in when the court would not, and in
reality have compensated for the loss of sentimental aspects of the family
relation. PRossEa, TORTS § 105, at 715 (2d ed. 1955).
146. Szofran v. Century Elec. Co., 255 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
147. Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943). Failure to show
such damage will limit recovery to nominal damages. Bagley v. City of St. Louis,
268 Mo. 259, 186 S.W. 966 (1916).
148. Wente v. Shaver, supra note 147.
149. Hegberg v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 164 Mo. App. 514, 147 S.W. 192 (1912);
see Johnson v. Dixie Mining & Dev. Co., 171 Mo. App. 134, 156 S.W. 33 (1913).
However, those relatives who have not suffered pecuniary loss may not be con-
sidered in the instructions. Newell v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 205 Mo. App. 543,
226 S.W. 80 (1920).
150. Morgan v. Oronogo Circle Mining Co., 160 Mo. App. 99, 141 S.W. 735
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Debts owed by the deceased to the beneficiary, however, are not con-
sidered, for the recovery does not go into the estate of the deceased,
and the defendant is not, by reason of his tort, bound to pay the debts
of the deceased., Pecuniary injury may be shown even though the
deceased was not legally bound to support the beneficiary. The courts
have said that dependency in fact, and not law, is the important
thing. 52 The same reasoning is not used when, without consent of the
deceased, the beneficiary voluntarily assumes an obligation the law
would not have imposed; thus funeral and medical expenses are not
to be considered if there was no legal obligation for the beneficiary to
incur them."3
CONCLUSION
The statute, in its present form, does not totally abrogate the com-
mon law rule of no recovery for wrongful death. It neither provides
for total compensation nor does it compensate all those pecuniarily
injured. Furthermore, there are indications that it is not the inten-
tion of the legislature to abolish totally that rule. First, the statute
has always contained a limit on the amount of recovery. This clearly
indicates that the statute was not intended to indemnify but rather to
partially shift the loss. Second, the statute has always retained the
concept of a preferential right. The practical effect of this is that the
person considered most deserving by the legislature receives compen-
sation while all others receive nothing, and this has persisted even
though the legislature has at times extended the provisions of the act
to cover new persons. Whether the legislature fully realized the im-
(1911). Here the plaintiff failed to show what the deceased could reasonably
accumulate in his lifetime. The court held he was entitled, at least, to nominal
damages. The indication is that the court would have allowed more but had no
guide lines as to how much. The approach of the court in determining such ac-
cumulation is similar to the rule in those states that follow the "loss to the
estate" formula; the court looks at the probable net earning of the deceased dur-
ing his life expectancy, deducting his expenses. Bagley v. City of St. Louis, 268
Mo. 259, 186 S.W. 966 (1916). See text accompanying note 105 supra. Missouri
courts have not ruled squarely on whether loss of inheritance is an element of
damage. Loss of prospective earnings is closely related but it is not quite the
same. The above cases are as far as the courts have gone on the subject. Such
consideration should be limited to the personal representative's suit. See 25
C.J.S. Death § 110 (1941).
151. McCullough v. W. H. Powell Lumber Co., 205 Mo. App. 15, 216 S.W. 803
(1919).
152. Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943); McCullough v.
W. H. Powell Lumber Co., supra note 151.
153. Miller v. Williams, 76 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. 1934); McCulluogh v. W. H. Powell
Lumber Co., supra note 151. This rule probably also applies to a suit by a wife or
child. See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 102 (1935).
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port of these factors is not possible to determine in the absence of a
clear legislative pronouncement; and, whether the results are desir-
able is a political question beyond the scope of this note. Assuming
that the policy behind the statute is that of partial compensation, it
may be said that the statute has adequately fulfilled its purpose.
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